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Mathematical Formalization and the Analysis of Cantillon Effects 
by Rudy van Zijp and Hans Visser1 
1. Introduction 
The 1970s saw the rise of two research programmes, namely the Austrian School 
and New Classical Economics.2 Both programmes have given considerable 
attention to monetary explanations of business cycles. The Austrian revival aims 
at elaborating the ideas of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. In the 
early 1930s the latter's business cycle theory was one of the main explanations of 
the business cycle, but it was virtually swept aside by the Keynesian revolution. It 
emphasized distributional effects in transition (disequilibrium) periods, which 
arise because of the non-neutrality of money. New Classical Economics can be 
regarded as a strong version of Monetarism. It draws on the ideas of Friedman 
(1968) and Phelps (1967), in the sense that it holds that in a situation of comple-
te information (i.e. in the 'long run') money is neutral. Business cycles result 
from imperfect knowledge and imperfect foresight of economie agents. 
The respective Austrian and New Classical explanations of business 
cycles closely resemble each other.3 Both deal with rational economie agents 
who make decisions in a flexible-price environment and who must deal with 
imperfect knowledge and imperfect foresight. Furthermore, both stress the 
importance of economy-wide interdependenties. This has led some economists to 
conclude that New Classicals elaborate on the work of Mises and particularly 
Hayek, so that the Austrian revival and New Classical Economics are variations 
on a theme.4 Butos (1986) opined that this conclusion is correct though misle-
ading, because it neglects some important methodological differences. New 
Classical methodology prescribes that economie theories should be formulated as 
mathematical models. Lucas (1980) defined a theory as "... an explicit set of in-
The authors wish to thank Dr. B. Elzas, Dr. M. Janssen, Dr. J. Birner and Drs. E. Wubben 
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 We shall use the Lakatosian term 'research programme' in a loose, indicative way, i.e., 
without specifying a hard core, protective belt, and positive and negative heuristic. Nor shall we 
appraise the growth of knowledge in both 'programmes'. 
3
 We shall limit our analysis to monetary explanations of business cycles. 
4
 For instance, see Kantor (1979), Colander and Guthrie (1980), Laidler (1982) and Scheide 
(1986). 
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structions for building a parallel or analogue system - a mechanical, imitation 
economy" (p. 272).5 He opined that scientific analysis presupposes mathematical 
formalization.6 In contrast, Hayek increasingly recognized the limitations of 
comparative-static general-equilibrium analysis.7 This also applies to the mathe-
matical versions of such analysis, so that he was somewhat sceptical about the 
usefulness of mathematical formalization.8 In general, Austrians criticize mathe-
matical formalization on at least three accounts. Firstly, they argue that in princi-
ple mathematical techniques cannot successfully deal with key features of econo-
mie reality, because mathematical models cannot adequately incorporate the role 
of entrepreneurship and Knightean uncertainty in market economies.9 Secondly, 
Austrians criticize the mechanistic interpretation of mathematical models. Accor-
ding to Mises (1953), such an interpretation does not leave any room for future 
5
 Page numbers refer to the 1981 reprint of Lucas (1980). 
Lucas (1980, p. 272) identified advances in mathematical problem-solving techniques as one 
of the main sources of scientific progress. As Butos (1986, p. 337nl0) observed, this is reflected in 
Lucas and Sargent's work on the Rational Expectations Hypothesis. In the 1960s they had already 
been aware of Muth's (1961) REH, but mathematical difficulties prevented them from building 
general-equilibrium models which included the hypothesis. Lucas's elimination of Knightean 
uncertainty also reflects the view that 'mathematical techniques' constrain scientific analysis. 
This is not to say, of course, that in his view economy-wide interdependenties are not 
important. On the contrary, he continued to stress these interdependencies. 
8
 Hayek (1941 (1950), p. viii) acknowledged that mathematical formalization may be useful in 
the analysis of "... a greater number of variables than can conveniently be dealt with in ordinary 
language", but he added that "... the power of mathematical tools - and most certainly of those 
which I could command - also has its limits [because] ... the problems with which we have to deal 
here are so complex that I soon found that, in order to make them amenable to exact mathemati-
cal treatment and at the same time to keep this treatment on a plane where I could even attempt 
it, I had to introducé much more drastic simplifications than seemed compatible with the object" 
(p. ix). In other words, Hayek argued that he could only have formalized his pure theory of capital 
and hence his version of the ABCT at the cost of oversimplification. However, unlike Mises and his 
followers, he does not exclude the use of matematical formalizations per se. 
9
 Austrians argue that mathematical models can only incorporate 'risk' (with the help of proba-
bility calculus) and not 'uncertainty'. Given the importance of the latter for entrepreneurship, 
mathematical models cannot deal with the crucial role of entrepreneurship in any market economy. 
This means that they abstract from a feature of economie reality which Austrians consider of great 
significance. Lucas (1976, p. 224) downplayed this line of argument by arguing that fundamental 
uncertainty does not play an important role in the explanation of business cycles, because business 
cycle theorists (including the Austrians) regard these cycles as repeated instances of essentially 
similar events. Their recurrence means that risk will be much more important than fundamental 
uncertainty. He even opined that "[i]n cases of uncertainty, economie reasoning will be of no value" 
(p. 224). However, this conclusion appears to go too far because it eliminates entrepreneurship 
from the domain of economies. 
2 
decisions which may alter the structure (and not merely the parameter values) of 
the economy. This, in turn, is inconsistent with the (Austrian) view that man is 
'free' to choose. Thirdly, Austrians argue that the restrictions imposed on 
economie theory in the process of mathematization are inappropriate, in the 
sense that they exclude relevant aspects of economie reality from analysis. This is 
not to say that they reject abstraction and simplification. After all, all theorizing 
implies the introduction of simplifying assumptions. Instead, the Austrian 
position holds that mathematical models oversimplify social reality. 
Austrians and New Classicals thus differ in their views about the 
appropriateness of mathematical formalization. Butos (1986, p. 337) even 
concluded that "... new classical economists limit their conceptualization by the 
techniques available, while for Hayek [and other Austrians] the conceptualizati-
on of a problem points to the limitations of the available techniques." These 
limitations force New Classicals to introducé additional simplifying assumptions. 
In contrast, Austrians reject this introduction on the grounds that they unduely 
restrict the scope of economie analysis. Butos's claim, however, does not make 
clear how the difference in methodological prescription brings about differences 
in content between the respective business cycle theories. That is, it does not 
explicate which additional simplifying assumptions are introduced. Our paper 
attempts to give such an explication. The problem then rises which additional 
abstractions should be introduced. Hoover (1988) has labelled this problem the 
Cournot problem, as August Cournot (1927, p. 127) already observed that "... in 
reality the economie system is a whole of which all the parts are connected and 
react on each other. ... It seems, therefore, as if, for a complete and rigorous 
solution of the problems relative to some parts of the economie system, it were 
indispensable to take the entire system into consideration. But this would surpass 
the powers of mathematical analysis and of our practical methods of calculation, 
even if the values of all the constants could be assigned to them numerically." 
The economy is too complex to be modelled in its entirety, and hence some 
simplifying assumptions must be introduced in order to render mathematical 
formalization possible. This introduction of additional simplifying assumptions 
implies that mathematical models will differ in content from non-mathematically 
formulated theories. It will be argued that in the case of New Classical and Aus-
trian economics these differences concern distribution effects and, more specifi-
cally, what Blaug (1990, p. 21) called Cantillon effects. Our paper will list those 
New Classical assumptions which ensure the elimination of these effects from 
analysis, and explains some differences in content between Austrian and New 
Classical business cycle theory as the result of their differences in opinion on the 
3 
appropriateness of mathematical formalization. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short historical 
discussion of the concept of monetary neutrality, arguing that money can hardly 
be neutral in the long term, let alone in the short one. Section 3 covers Hayek's 
business cycle theory, which can be seen as a complex synthesis of Menger's 
structure of production, Wicksell's distinction between the natural and the 
market rate of interest, Mises's monetary theory, Cantillon's distribution effects 
and Hayek's own views on the dispersion of knowledge (and hence imperfect 
knowledge and expectational errors). Section 4 discusses New Classical monetary 
business cycle theory in general, and its modelling strategies in particular. New 
Classicals adopt two such strategies, namely the 'representative-agent approach' 
and the 'islands approach', with the latter a sophisticated version of the former. 
Section 5 gives some conclusions. It lists the simplifying assumptions introduced 
by the NCE, and discusses the way in which they preclude the analysis of 
distribution effects. 
2. A short history of monetary (non-) neutrality 
In the discussion on the neutrality of money two strands can be discerned. First 
of all, we have the quantity theory proposition that ceteris paribus a change in the 
money supply only influences the price level. Neutrality in this case means that 
changes in the money supply in a comparative-statics analysis leave relative 
prices and real magnitudes unaffected.10 During the adjustment process from 
one equilibrium state to another money is seen as affecting relative prices and 
quantities, though. Secondly, attempts have been made to identify the conditions 
under which money would not affect relative prices and quantities at all. 
Neutrality in this case means that monetary equilibrium is maintained at all 
times.11 We shall first discuss neutrality of money in the second sense and then 
dweil somewhat longer on neutrality in the first sense. 
Some writers see this as the more recent definition of neutral money, cf. Lutz (1969, p. 112) 
and Klausinger (1989, p. 177). But it was implied in the quantity theory all along and thus predates 
the other connotation of neutral money by a couple of centuries. 
11
 Monetary equilibrium is defined as the situation in which the money supply at any moment 
in time equals the volume of money demanded. In Dutch discussions of the 1950s the term was 
also used within the framework of period analysis, in the sense that income earned in one period 
and available in the next period is equal to income earned in the next period. In other words, 
national income is constant. This connotation of the term is not applied here. See for references 
Visser (1971, p. 404). 
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The idea of neutrality of money in the sense of uninterrupted monetary 
equilibrium is commonly traced back to Wicksell's Geldzins und Güterpreise 
(1962, p. 102), even if Wicksell did not use the term neutral money.12 His 
defïnition of neutral interest was tantamount to neutrality of money in the second 
sense, though.13 Wicksell maintained that neutrality implied a stable price level. 
His Swedish colleague Davidson was quick to point out that in an economy with 
increasing factor productivity monetary equilibrium or neutral money implied a 
falling price level (cf. Myrdal (1933, p. 436) and Thomas (1935, pp. 37 - 40)). 
Hayek refined Wicksell's analysis, first seeing a constant money supply and later 
a constant money flow per unit of time as the criterion for the neutrality of 
money, until Koopmans finally showed that no empirical yardstick can be found 
for monetary equilibrium.14 
The aim of the monetary equilibrium theorists was to find the conditions 
under which a monetary economy would function as if money did not exist and 
relative prices consequently were only determined in the real sector.15 A mone-
tary economy was thus compared with a barter economy, a barter economy, 
however, where markets function without frictions.16 This amounts to a wild 
goose chase, because if markets function without friction no reason can be found 
why people would ever decide to use money in the first place. Money that is no 
more than a veil will be blown away and if it is indeed "... the oil which renders 
the motion of the wheels [of trade] more smooth and easy" as Hume (1955, p. 
33) put it, the wheels of trade will run much faster and further with money than 
without. In other words, a monetary economy has a different transactions 
technology than a barter economy. Now the likes of Koopmans realized full well 
that money is used just because barter exehange is not frictionless and their 
12
 The term 'neutral mone/ appears to have been introduced by L. von Bortkiewicz in 1919, 
see De Jong (1973, p. 8n) and Patinkin and Steiger (1989, p. 135). 
13
 Wicksell (1962, p. 102) defines the natural rate of interest as "the rate of interest which 
would be determined by supply and demand if no use were made of money and all lending were 
effected in the form of real capital goods." 
14
 The discussion has been admirably summarized by De Jong (1973). See also Visser (1971). 
15
 Cf. Hayek (1967, p. 31; 1984, p. 159) and Koopmans (1933, p. 228). 
16
 In a letter to Robertson (reprinted in Fase (1983, pp. 322 - 28)) Koopmans explained that 
his frame of reference was an ideal equilibrium economy where, in his words, no stocks of goods 
had to be held for mere liquidity purposes, i.e., a frictionless barter economy. 
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construct of a frictionless barter economy was only a thought experiment.17 
Lutz (1969, p. 105) sees this as an attempt to express the idea that, if a general 
depression is to be avoided in a monetary economy, it should behave like a 
barter economy because in a barter economy Say's Law applies.18 Still, this 
could not disguise the futility of the whole operation. Leaving on one side the 
question whether there is much sense in analysing money in a general-equilibri-
um model where all goods exchange against all goods, the analysis of neutral 
money in the sense of monetary equilibrium at all times can better remain 
confined to the model of a monetary economy. There is no need to make a 
comparison with a barter economy.19 Incidentally, if barter trade is not friction-
less, even Say's Law would not suffice to prevent depressions. With frictions, in 
particular imperfect information on other agents' supply and demand functions, 
some goods offered in the market may fail to find a taker and economie activity 
declines, even if all excess demands neatly sum up to zero. In a general-equili-
brium model with money, the conditions under which monetary equilibrium is 
maintained can be analyzed with exactly the results which Wicksell, Davidson, 
Hayek and Koopmans came up with. If monetary equilibrium is maintained at all 
times, Say's Equality holds true, i.e., there is no excess demand or excess supply 
on all goods markets combined (if we neglect the markets for other financial 
assets than money). Still, equilibrium relative prices in goods markets are also 
dependent on monetary factors, as has been made clear by the discussion on the 
classical dichotomy (Becker and Baumol (1962) and Patinkin (1965, pp. 75, 
175)). If the monetary and real sectors are completely separate, the price level is 
indeterminate and the quantity theory cannot hold good. 
The discussion on the neutrality of money in the monetary equilibrium 
sense focused on the conditions necessary for maintaining monetary equilibrium 
17
 Koopmans (1933, p. 230) talks about an hypothetical situation that could not exist in reality, 
& "hypothetische, in der Realitat wohl überhaupt nicht denkbare Zustand." 
18
 Hayek (1967, p. 130) defined the problem as "... one of isolating the one-sided effects of 
money ... which will appear when, after the division of the barter transaction into two separate 
transactions, one of these takes place without the other complementary transaction." This supports 
Lutz's view. 
19
 Patinkin (1965, p. 75) attempted to "... conceive of a barter economy as the limiting position 
of a money economy whose nominal quantity of money is made smaller and smaller." He could nol 
but concede that the price level falls in the process, leaving the real quantity of money unchanged, 
but still maintained, then and also a quarter of a century later (Patinkin and Steiger (1989, p. 138)) 
that "[t]his drawback notwithstanding, there does not seem to be any other meaningful way of 
comparing the respective equilibrium positions of a barter and money economy." We would suggest 
that there is no meaningful way at all to compare these equilibrium positions. 
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in the face of specific changes in the real sector of the economy. The excess 
demand functions in the real sector of the economy and with it the demand 
functions for real cash balances were assumed to change. The quantity-theory 
comparative-statics approach to the neutrality of money by contrast can be said 
to study the effects of changes in the money supply with constant excess demand 
functions in the real sectors of the economy and consequently a constant demand 
function for real cash balances. The interesting question here is whether, and if 
so to what extent, developments in the monetary sphere can have lasting effects 
on relative prices and hence quantities in the real sector.20 The conditions for 
neutrality in the comparative-statics sense have been shown to be quite strict. 
First of all, money should be intrinsically valueless paper money or bank money. 
A change in the volume of full-blooded silver or gold money would not only 
have an impact on the general price level, but would also change relative prices 
of goods produced from silver or gold and other goods. Aschheim and Hsieh 
(1969, pp. 213 - 15) formulate six further conditions for neutrality of money in 
the comparative-statics sense: (1) price flexibility, (2) absence of money illusion, 
(3) absence of distribution effects, (4) static price expectations, (5) absence of a 
combination of internal and external money, or credit money and base money, 
(6) absence of government debt and open-market policies.21 Aschheim (1973, p. 
78) even goes so far as to claim that the conditions for neutrality of money 
imply, again, the absence of money (as a unit of account). Static price expectati-
ons are in his view incompatible with perfectly flexible prices, freedom from 
money illusion and the absence of uncompensated distribution effects of price 
level changes.22 The condition of static price expectations may, however, be too 
strict.23 Conditions (5) and (6) are based on the idea that changes in the money 
supply change the composition of asset holders' wealth portfolios and with it the 
rate of interest.24 These conditions could be reformulated in the sense that 
M
 Few, if any, quantity theorists denied that money is non-neutral in the short period, see 
Visser (1974, pp. 135 - 36) and Humphrey (1991). 
21
 Cf. the seminal article by Metzier (1951). 
22
 Conditions (5) and (6) are not mentioned in Aschheim's 1973 article and condition (3) is 
reformulated as the absence of uncompensated distribution effects. Presumably conditions (5) and 
(6) are now subsumed under (3). 
23
 See Visser (1971, pp. 423 - 25) and (1974, pp. 176 - 77). 
24
 See on this Patinkin (1965, pp. 288 - 94). Patinkin notes that neutrality is retained if govern-
ment bonds are not seen as net wealth. See also Patinkin (1989). 
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portfolio composition should not change, so that if the money supply changes, 
the volume of nominal debt changes proportionally. Likewise, condition (3) 
could be broadened to include the neutrality of distribution effects, as Aschheim 
in fact did in his 1973 article. Finally, the long-term inflation rate in the economy 
should be constant, as both the Mundell-Tobin effect and non-neutral tax effects 
preclude superneutrality. Neutrality in the comparative-statics sense therefore 
can only be restricted to stepwise changes in the money supply, not to changes in 
the growth rate of money. This case could be subsumed under the condition of 
the neutrality of distribution effects. 
The distribution effects call for further comment. As will be more 
extensively discussed below, Austrian analysis follows Cantillon and emphasizes 
that money enters into circulation in specific ways, affecting the structure of 
spending and consequently relative prices, including the rate of interest, and 
quantities. It follows that money, especially if created through credit but also 
from an international payments balance, changes demand and supply functions in 
the real sector.25 Cantillon (1964, Part 2, Ch. 10) explained that money that 
enters into circulation through money lenders brings with it a lowering of the 
rate of interest, while money that enters into circulation through consumptive 
expenditure by the rich makes the rate of interest rise, because the producers of 
consumption goods face an increase in demand and have to borrow money in 
order to increase production. One expression of distribution effects is the 
phenomenon of forced savings. This follows if the expenditure of entrepreneurs 
who borrow money to increase production makes prices rise and in that way 
brings about a reduction in real consumption.26 Another case of distribution 
effects is the redistribution of real wealth between debtors and creditors in the 
case of (unforeseen) price level changes, a redistribution that according to Fisher 
(1933) and Keynes (1961, p. 264) could seriously worsen a depression, once 
started. A special kind of distribution effects, which has only recently received 
serious attention (Bikker (1991a and 1991b), concerns the redistribution of inte-
rest income if the rate of interest changes. 
Post-Keynesian analysis also emphasizes distribution effects, but it tends to play down the 
impact of money on other economie variables, stressing instead the residual character of money. 
Nonetheless, money is far from neutral in their analysis, as its creation is dependent on the 
borrowing needs of all kinds of economie actors and borrowing is influenced by the central bank's 
interest rate policies. See Arestis (ed.) (1988). 
26
 The phenomenon of 'forced savings' was already discerned by Ricardo, who considered it 
relevant for the short run only. Other economists have acknowledged that forced savings could also 
change the natural rate of interest. For a history of the notion of forced saving see Hayek (1932), 
Viner (1964, pp. 187 - 97) and Humphrey (1991, pp. 9 - 11). 
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New developments in growth theory serve to underline the likelihood of 
non-neutrality of money supply changes. In general-equilibrium models, demand 
and supply functions usually are well-behaved linear functions and the system is 
stable or assumed to be stable: after the business cycle has run its course 
everybody is happily back on his or her largely unchanged demand or supply 
curve. With nonlinearities, as emphasized by the new growth theory, any tempo-
rary expansion in an industry may perpetuate itself because relative prices 
between goods are changed in the process. It is, for example, quite possible for a 
country to specialize in the production of a good the production of which was 
quite accidentally increased during some period thanks to a monetary shock. The 
new growth economics emphasizes that investment recreates investment opportu-
nities (see FitzGerald Scott (1989, in particular p. 159), Lucas (1988), Romer 
(1986)), or success breeds success. Distribution effects are then even more likely 
to result in lasting changes in the real sectors. More generally it is acknowledged 
that deviations from an equilibrium growth path, through their impact on invest-
ments and on technology, if technological growth is endogenous, may change the 
equilibrium growth path itself (cf. Solow (1988, in particular pp. 311 - 12)). This 
ties in with chaos theory, which shows that in nonlinear systems a small change 
in initial conditions will lead to significant changes in the time path of a function 
(see, e.g., Butler (1990), Kelsey (1990)). The result is hysteresis, or the phenome-
non that deviations from an equilibrium path change the equilibrium path itself. 
New developments in economie theory therefore tend to emphasise the deviati-
on-amplifying tendenties of shocks rather than the stability of any growth path. 
The above indicates that recently economists have increasingly recogni-
zed the importance of forces that affect the comparative-statics neutrality of 
money. It will be shown below that Hayek focused on a subset of these forces. 
His business cycle theory interprets cyclical fluctuations in output and investment 
in terms of non-neutral monetary injections in a specific market. The ensuing 
Cantillon effects distort the socalled 'structure of production'. 
3. The analysis of Cantillon effects: the Hayekian BCT 
Hayek's version of Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) starts from a notion of 
intertemporal general equilibrium, which he defined as a series of situations in 
which economie agents have complete information and perfect foresight about 
preferences and the means of production at every point of time during the 
planning period (1928, p. 76). Such an equilibrium is maintained if the agents do 
not make expectational errors (p. 85). However, in reality agents do not have 
9 
complete information, so that they cannot avoid making such errors. In fact, 
Hayek (1933a, p. 141) argued that "[e]very explanation of economie crises [and, 
more generally, of business cycles] must include the assumption that entre-
preneurs have committed errors." That is, he interpreted business cycles as 
disequilibrium phenomena. But such cycles will only arise if economie agents (or 
rather entrepreneurs) make similor expectational errors. According to Hayek 
(1933a, p. 141), this will be the case if they are misled by following guides and 
symptoms which as a rule prove reliable. One of these rules (and in capitalist 
economies presumably the most important one) is the price system. Economie 
agents base their actions on actual and expected prices. In equilibrium, actual 
prices reflect the scarcity of consumer goods and production factors, which 
means that they are in accordance with the preferences of the economie agents. 
However, in disequilibrium they are distorted, in the sense that they do not 
accurately reflect these underlying preferences. In general, Austrians interpret 
business cycles as the result of price distortions. 
Hayek concentrated on the price which figures most prominently in in-
vestment decisions, namely the interest rate. His theory explains why this rate 
may be distorted and what the consequences of such distortion are. He thereby 
adopted Wicksell's distinction between the market and the natural rate of 
interest.27 Wicksell (1962) defined the latter as the long-run equilibrium rate of 
interest, which reflects the time-preferences of the economie agents. The 
'market' (or money) rate of interest is determined on the loan market, and is the 
rate at which the supply of loanable funds equals the demand for loans. This 
rate need not equal the natural rate, and thus need not reflect the agents' time-
preferences. This difference results either because of a change in the natural 
rate, or because of a change in the market rate. Hayek argued that the process 
resulting from the former change must be interpreted as a mere adjustment 
process to a new equilibrium situation, instead of a business cycle. Therefore, we 
concentrate on a change in the market rate, which (initially) does not affect the 
2
 As Haberler (1946, p. 36, note 1) observed, "[t]he concept of a 'natural rate' (and even the 
term) can be found in earlier English economie writings." For instance, Adam Smith (1976, I.vii, p. 
65) already used the term when arguing that "[t]he natural price ... is, as it were, the central price, 
to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating." More importantly, Henry 
Thornton (1978, pp. 253 - 55) already explicated the so-called indirect mechanism, which holds that 
an increase in the supply of money is translated in a rise in the general price level through a fall in 
the market rate of interest and the ensuing increase in investment. He used the idea of an 
equilibrium or natural rate of interest, although he did not yet attach the adjective 'natural' to it. 
He did use this term in 1811. However, Wicksell's student Carl Uhr (1962, p. 200) argued that 
Wicksell had not been directly exposed to Thornton's ideas, and that the influence was merely indi-
rect, namely through Ricardo. 
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natural rate. Such a change is caused by monetary expansion.28 As Hayek 
(1975, pp. 148 - 49) observed, this expansion of the money supply may be 
brought about by either of three circumstances: (1) changes in the volume of 
cash, caused by the in- and outflow of gold, (2) changes in the volume of money, 
as regulated by the monetary authorities (which include the government and the 
central bank), and (3) the creation of deposits by private banks.29 As Hayek's 
emphasis shifted in time, we shall discuss monetary expansion in general, disre-
garding its source.30 The ABCT assumes that such an expansion enters the 
economy on the loan market. The market rate of interest then falls below the 
natural rate, which raises the present value of all investment projects. As 
O'Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, p. 205) showed, this rise in present value is a result 
of three effects: (1) a discount rate effect, (2) cost effects, and (3) derived-
demand effects. The first two effects work in the same direction, namely by 
increasing the present value of all investment projects. The discount rate effect 
starts from the fact that the market rate of interest is used as a discount rate, so 
that the present value of the expected future returns of investment projects 
increases. Moreover, the market rate is also the price to be paid on loans. A fall 
in this rate reduces the costs of investment projects, and therefore increases their 
net present value. The discount-rate and cost effects result in general ove/invest-
This means that in Hayek's terminology a business cycle is by definition caused by monetary 
expansion. 
29
 This process of credit creation can be made clear as follows. Gonsider a banking system in 
which private banks must adhere to a fractional reserve ratio. An increase in the volume of 
deposits will raise the reserve ratio, thus enabling the bank to increase its loans (and vice versa). 
However, such a simple relationship between loans and deposits does not apply to the banking 
system as a whole. This system is able to multiply credit, if the initial credit expansion is (partly) 
deposited at another bank, which in turn increases its loans. This process of 'credit multiplication' 
can go on indefinitely, as long as the additional credit is not used in a way which leads quickly to 
the market for consumer goods (as in the latter case the credit is not deposited with another 
bank). Hayek (1975, p. 160) concluded that in this way the banking system as a whole "... can grant 
credit to an amount several times greater than the sum originally deposited." The 'credit multiplier' 
process is an unintended consequence which arises from the fact that it is profitable for private 
banks to lend as much as possible, given the fractional reserve ratio of the banking system under 
consideration. 
30
 Contrary to bis forerunner Mises, Hayek (1975, p. 150) considered the First influence 
empirically less important and the second a rather special case. Mises had criticized the monetary 
policy of the 1920s, which were highly infiationist, thus explaining cyclical fluctuations as the result 
of exogenous disturbances. In contrast, Hayek attempted to elaborate an endogenous business cycle 
theory, thereby concentrating on the third influence. However, in the 1970s he considered the 
second influence to be the most important. He then proposed to denationalize money, which would 
render it impossible for the monetary authorities to pursue inflationary policy. This changed his 
explanation of business cycles from an endogenous into an exogenous one. 
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ment, which will exist as long as entrepreneurs find it worthwhüe to invest (i.e., 
as long as they expect that the process of monetary expansion continues).31 The 
ensuing gap between planned investment and planned savings is filled by forced 
savings. This phenomenon arises because during the expansion process entrepre-
neurs compete for the factors of production. As the boom proceeds, these factors 
become more and more fuUy employed. The higher rate of investment can then 
be maintained only if the factors of production are transferred from the consu-
mer to the producer goods industries. Entrepreneurs bid up the prices of these 
factors. As a consequence, their owners experience a rise in income. They 
increase their consumer demand. However, the transfer of the factors of produc-
tion from the consumer to the capital goods industries has prohibited a rise in 
the supply of the former. Hence the prices of these goods rise. This forces indivi-
duals who have not (yet) experienced a rise in income to curb their consumption. 
Forced savings thus result from redistributions in income.32 These redistribu-
tions presuppose that some individuals will experience a rise in income earlier 
than others, because their productive activities are more in demand. This can 
only be the case if their (productive) activities differ from those of others. Fur-
thermore, the non-simultaneity of the rise in their respective incomes also 
reflects the fact that money does not spread immediately throughout the 
economy because production is organized Vertically'. That is, it takes place in 
successive stages of production and hence is a time-consuming activity (see 
below). The boom comes to an end when the additional money stops flowing 
into the economy. 
The ABCT thus explains industrial fluctuations as a result of an increase 
in the money supply, the fall in the market rate of interest, and the ensuing 
discount-rate and costs effects. However, this fall does not only affect the volume 
of investment but also its composition. An important characteristic of the ABCT 
is its emphasis on Cantillon effects, which arise from the fact that the additional 
money enters the economy at a specific point (namely as investable funds) and 
Note that this result not only applies to unanticipated but also to anticipated monetary 
expansion. 
32
 Note that when preferences and patterns of expenditure differ between economie agents, the 
redistributions of income also imply shifts in the relevant general equilibrium, and hence changes 
in the natural rate of interest. Moreover, the effects of the redistributions depend on the route 
according to which the additional money spreads throughout the economy. It seems therefore 
correct to infer that the relevant general equilibrium changes continuously. 'the target is moving'. 
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only gradually spreads through the economy.33 The effects of this spread can be 
discussed in more detail. However, we must first briefly consider the framework 
in which this discussion takes place. This framework is constituted by the 
structure of production. Carl Menger (1968, pp. 8 - 10) classified capital goods 
according to the functions they perform in the process of production. He used 
their 'remoteness' from consumption as a criterion for classification. Consumer 
goods are called 'goods of the first order', capital goods which are used in the 
production of these first-order goods are called second-order goods, capital 
goods which produce second-order goods are called third-order goods, and so 
forth. Hence there is a vertical relationship between heterogeneous capital goods. 
It is possible to distinguish stages of production which can be classified in a 
marmer similar to that of capital goods. Taken together, these stages form a 
structure of production. This structure is vertical, in the sense that production 
takes place in successive stages: production in a given stage depends on producti-
on in a higher-order stage. 
The fall in the market rate of interest does not affect all investment 
projects to the same degree, nor even in the same manner. That is, it does not 
only lead to a discount-rate effect and cost effects, but also to derived-demand 
effects. These effects affect different orders of goods differently. If entrepreneurs 
mistakenly interpret the fall in the market rate of interest as reflecting a fall in 
the natural rate, they will conclude that the agents' time-preferences have decre-
ased. This means that they expect current consumption demand to fall and future 
consumption demand to rise. It will then appear to be more profitable to invest 
in productive activities which yield consumption output in the more distant 
future. In other words, the present value of investment projects which involve 
higher order goods has increased, whereas that of others has decreased. This 
induces entrepreneurs to reallocate capital from the lower to the higher stages of 
production. In Austrian terms, the structure of production is 'lengthened' (or has 
become more 'roundabout'). However, this process of lengthening cannot go on 
indefinitely, because it will be checked by a shortage of resources.34 Hayek 
33
 In order to clarify his views Hayek (1969, p. 281) compared a situation of continuous credit 
creation to a situation in which a viscous liquid, such as honey (read: money), is poured into a 
vessel (the economy): "... if the stream hits the surface at one point, a little mound will form there 
from which the additional matter will slowly spread outward." This analogy reflects that there is no 
such thing as 'helicopter money'. It leaves the question unanswered why the liquid is viscous (i.e. 
why it takes so long for the additional money to spread throughout the economy). 
34
 In his criticisms on the Ricardo effect, Wilson (1940, p. 172) wondered whether it would not 
be possible for the economie system to remain in a new equilibrium at a higher level of activity. In 
his view, the initial credit expansion would lead to a larger (more capital-intensive) capital 
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(1939 (1950), p. 11) argued that at the later stages of the boom "... the prices of 
consumer goods do as a rule rise and real wages fall"35 The rise in consumer 
prices increases the profit margins on these goods, and hence induces entrepre-
neurs to reallocate capital from the production of capital goods to that of consu-
mer goods. The fall in real wages makes 'shorter' methods of production more 
profitable, so that there will be a tendency to use more labour with the existing 
machinery (by working overtime, doublé shifts, etc), and to invest in less 
expensive, less labour-saving or less durable machinery. Hayek argued that the 
implied decrease in the demand for capital goods will become so strong as to 
turn the boom into a recession. This effect is called the Ricardo effect?6 During 
the recession entrepreneurs will correct their investment errors by reallocating 
their capital from higher to lower order goods.37 In turn, the recession ends 
either because of an increase in the supply of money, or because of the reverse 
operation of the Ricardo effect. 
The above suggests that the ABCT contains at least two unique features. 
Firstly, it adopts the Austrian framework of the structure of production. This 
means that capital goods are heterogeneous, and that they stand in a vertical, 
time-consuming relationship to each other. Secondly, the ABCT incorporates 
Cantillon effects, in the sense that an increase in the supply of money leads to 
redistributions between the owners of different factors of production and 
between the entrepreneurs in different stages of production. As Foss (1990, p. 6, 
italics in original) pointed out, "Hayek's argument is ... dependent ... on the time 
structure. This means that the economy is richer with a larger per capita capital stock that could 
produce enough income to generate the savings to maintain itself. Then there is no reason why a 
depression would emerge. Hayek (1933b (1939), p. 180) had already allowed for this possibility, but 
considered it very unlikely. 
35
 He defined the real wage rate as the ratio of the money wage rate and the prices of the 
consumer goods produced by the labour under consideration (p. 8). 
36
 This effect derives its name from Ricardo's (1978, Ch. I, Section V, p. 26ff.) statement that 
"... with every rise in the price of labour, new temptations are offered to the use of machinery." It is 
designed to show that the boom will come to an end even if the market rate of interest were to 
remain constant. Hayek had already shown in his Prices and Production (1931) that the boom 
would cease in a situation in which the market rate of interest was perfectly flexible. 
37
 It should be noted that the Ricardo effect assumes that entrepreneurs expect the relatively 
higher prices of consumer goods and the relatively lower real wages to persist for a period of time 
that is long enough to make it worthwhile to change their methods of production. Hayek (1939 
(1950), pp. 16 - 18) acknowledged this. Moreover, he also addressed the case in which the 
entrepreneurs expect that the prices of consumer goods continue to rise. This will merely reinforce 
the effect, due to the continuing fall in real wages. 
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path of real factor incomes relative to the linear representation of productive 
activities [i.e. the vertical structure of production] and the lags this implies." It 
takes time before the mound of money is spread out evenly throughout the 
economy. The ensuing distortion of the structure of relative prices follows from 
the fact that economie agents differ from each other. These differences may 
concern (a) their utility functions, (b) their abilities to gather information (and 
hence their information sets), (c) their expectations formation functions, and/or 
(d) their productive activities (i.e. the order of goods which they produce). The 
latter feature appears to be the most important as it accounts for the ma/invest-
ments and the ensuing distortion of the structure of production. 
As was stated above, Austrians tend to deny the appropriatenes and 
usefulness of mathematical formalization. Not surprisingly, they have never 
attempted to formalize their views, although in recent years some hybrid forms 
have arisen. For instance, Thalenhorst and Wenig (1984) offer a mathematical 
formalization of Hayek's Prices and Production (1931), but they assume that the 
rate of profit is identical for each stage of production (p. 217). This absence of 
inter-stage profit opportunities means that there are no distortions of the 
structure of production and hence that there cannot have been ma/investments. 
As Thalenhorst and Wenig acknowledge, their analysis cannot discuss Hayekian 
monetary dynamics (p. 215). It should be noted, though, that their mathematical 
model may serve as a starting point for mathematical analysis. Relaxation of 
some of its assumptions may render the analysis of Hayekian monetary dynamics 
possible. Nevertheless, until now Hayek's ABCT has never been formalized as a 
mathematical model. In contrast, New Classicals prescribe such mathematization, 
so that they are faced with the 'Cournot problem'. They 'solve' this problem by 
aggregating economie agents and/or goods. 
4. Abstracting from Cantillon effects: New Classical BCT 
In the 1970s interest in business cycle theory was revived by the so-called 
'rational expectations revolution'. The resulting research programme was called 
'New Classical Economics' (NCE).38 It started by formalizing Friedman's and 
Phelps' Natural Rate Hypothesis (NRH), which holds that in the long-run the 
economy will tend towards its so-called 'natural rate of output' (NRO) or 
38
 The main proponents are Robert Lucas, Jr., Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace, Robert Barro, 
Edward Prescott, and Finn Kydland. 
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equivalently 'natural rate of unemployment' (NRU).39 We restrict our analysis 
to the monetary version of New Classical business cycle theory. 
New Classical business cycle theory, or equilibrium business cycle theory 
(EBCT), adopts at least the following four assumptions. Firstly, economie agents 
are assumed to be price-takers, and a Walrasian tótonnement process ensures 
continuous market-clearing. Secondly, aggregate real output is formulated as the 
'Lucas supply curve'. Given the agents' information sets and expectations, the 
NRH holds. Thirdly, all agents form their expectations according to the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis (REH). Fourthly, such expectations formation takes 
place on the basis of an information set which does not allow for systematic 
expectational errors. That is, all persistence in deviations from the NRO (or 
equivalently NRU) must be accounted for by propagation mechanisms. 
New Classicals argue that business cycles are caused by exogenous 
shocks, which are either real or monetary in nature. The shocks are reflected in 
the prices which agents observe. They are thus confronted with a so-called signal 
extraction problem, in the sense that they must determine whether a given price 
change reflects a change in relative prices or in the general price level. The 
response of economie agents to a given price movement depends crucially on 
their expectations and hence on their information set. Under the assumption of 
perfect knowledge, the agents know which part of a price movement is perma-
nent, so that they can infer how to change their actions in order to act ex-post 
optimally. Monetary changes are presumed not to influence real variables, 
because rational economie agents do not suffer from money illusion, so that 
money is assumed to be neutral in the comparative-static sense.40 The com-
plete-information equilibrium is called the Natural Rate Equilibrium (NRE). In 
contrast, in the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) economie agents do not 
have complete information, so that they are confronted with a problem how to 
interpret a given price change. The solution to this signal extraction problem will 
be based on the agents' expectations about the relevant price movement, which 
are in turn based on their information sets. Given the incompleteness of the 
latter, the agents will make expectational errors. Such errors can be one of two 
kinds: either the agents mistakenly interpret a real change as a monetary one, or 
39
 As Maddock (1979, p. 158n4) observed, "[i]t is quite common in this [i.e. New Classical] 
literature to switch back and forth between income and unemployment by replacing log unemploy-
ment for log income minus log trend income." Therefore, the NRO and the NRU are considered 
to be reciprocal. 
40
 For instance, see Sargent and Wallace (1975, pp. 221 - 24). 
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they think that a monetary change is in fact a real one. In the former case, 
output and unemployment will be adjusted to the price movement as soon as the 
correct information becomes available. The economy then adjusts itself to its 
new NRE, albeit it with a lag, and there will be no business cycle. However, 
things will be different if economie agents respond to monetary changes as if 
they were real ones. Monetary changes will then have real effects, so that it 
seems as if the agents suffer from money illusion. The agents' information sets 
thus play a crucial role in EBCT.41 
According to the NCE, rational economie agents do not make systematic 
expectational errors, because such errors are easily detectable. After all, if the 
rate of inflation has been underestimated for a sequence of periods, then agents 
will be inclined to adjust their expectations formation function, so that the 
systematic component of their expectational error is eliminated. The problem 
then arises how unsystematic, serially uncorrelated, shocks can account for the 
persistence which characterizes the economie data over the business cycle. The 
NCE solves this problem by adopting a solution which had already been given in 
the 1930s. Slutzky (1937) and Frisch (1933) had already shown that random 
shocks could lead to serially correlated movements of the variables in the system 
under consideration, due to some propagation mechanism. Thus, the crucial dis-
tinction, as Lucas and Sargent (1978, p. 313) noted, is that between 'sources of 
impulses' and 'propagation mechanisms'. The latter ensure that serially uncorre-
lated disturbances will have serially correlated effects. Instances of such mecha-
nisms have been provided by Lucas (1975), Blinder and Fisher (1981), and 
Kydland and Prescott (1980), among others.42 These mechanisms are instances 
of what Barro (1981b, p. 48) called 'adjustment-costs explanations' of persistence. 
They explain persistence by introducing 'friction' into the economie system. 
It should be noted that the persistence discussed above only applies to 
Lucas (1987, p. 94, italics in original) emphasized this property of the NCE when discussing 
the (New-) Keynesian assumption that nominal prices are rigid because of some form of collective 
bargaining. He objected that "[t]he central issue for a theory of nominal price rigidity ... is not the 
nature of the game agents are assumed to be engaged in, but rather the information agents are 
assumed to have about the state of the system at each date." 
42
 Lucas (1975) accounted for persistence effects by incorporating physical capital, which is 
affected by random changes in the growth rate of money and the ensuing Mundell-Tobin effect. 
Once installed, the physical capital stock can only be adjusted at the rate of depreciation. Blinder 
and Fisher (1981) used the gradual adjustment of inventory stocks of finished goods as a mecha-
nism to ensure serial correlation. Kydland and Prescott (1980, p. 175) explain persistence by 
arguing that "... there are long lags from the time when changes in its determinants call for an 
increase in the capital stock until the time when the new capital starts yielding services." 
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deviations from the mean level of endogenous variables. This follows from the 
fact that New Classicals formulate their views as mathematical models, which 
means that the Cournot problem must be 'solved'. One may discern two strate-
gies which the NCE uses to address the Cournot problem, namely the 'repre-
sentative-agent approach' and the 'islands approach'. 
The representative-agent approach 
Early New Classical models were so-called 'representative-agent models'. The 
concept of the representative agent was first explicitly introduced by Marshall.43 
His 'representative firm' is some sort of non-mathematical, fictituous average 
entity (1947, p. 318). In contrast, the NCE defines the representative agent 
(whether individual, household, or firm) as the mathematical mean of the group 
(subsystem) as a whole.44 This means that the concept is used as a hypostatisa-
tion of the (sub)system as a whole.45 As Hoover (1988, p. 242) observed, New 
Classicals treat aggregates and index numbers as if they obey the principles of 
microeconomics. They restrict their analyses to the mathematical mean, accoun-
ting for deviations from this mean by adding a probability distribution. The 
expected value of these deviations are zero, which means that there are no a 
priori reasons why expectations and actions of different individuals will differ 
from each other. The representative agent by definition forms rational expectati-
ons which equal the mathematical mean of the aggregate expectations, albeit in 
a probabilistic sense. This property may be explained by arguing that the expec-
tational deviations will cancel out, presumably due to the 'Law of Large Num-
bers'.46 However, this 'law' is a statistical regularity which applies only if the 
43
 In Marshali's (1947, pp. 317 - 18, italics in original) view, "... a Representative firm is that 
particular average sort of firm, at which we need to look in order to see how far the economies, 
intemal and extemal, of production on a large scale have extended generally in the industry and 
country in question." 
44
 For instance, Lucas and Rapping (1969a, p. 25) deflate the aggregate labour supply function 
by an index of the number of hoüseholds, Lucas (1972, p. 68) assumes that each period N identical 
individuals are born who each supply n units of labour which yield n units of output. 
45
 This was already stressed by Runde and Torr (1985, p. 217), who argued that the rational 
expectations approach (i.e. the NCE) does not analyze individual, but rather the market's behav-
iour. In a general-equilibrium analysis this means that the representative individual is merely 
another way of depicting the system as a whole. 
46
 Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) argue that this will only hold under very special circum-
stances which concern the nature and intensity of the interrelations between the actions of the 
individuals. They distinguish two types of interrelations, namely congestion and synergism. The 
former applies when the incentive for agent i to engage in an activity will be lower if the number of 
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elements of the population under consideration belong to the same 'class', i.e., if 
they do not differ from each other in any relevant aspect. The assumption that 
the agents are identical will be called the homogeneity postulate. This postulate is 
adopted in the New Classical 'representative-agent models', which means that 
these models cannot analyze distributional effects. That is, the 'representative-
agent approach' of the NCE concentrates on the magnitude of aggregates, 
disregarding (changes in) their composition. It implies that redistributions 
between economie agents are considered to be irrelevant in the explanation of 
industrial fluctuations. This restriction of the domain of New Classical Econo-
mics could be circumvented by introducing several 'representative agents'. This 
strategy is adopted in the 'islands approach', which can be regarded as a more 
sophisticated version of the 'representative-agent approach'. 
The islands approach 
The 'islands approach' uses Phelps's (1970) suggestion that markets can be seen 
as islands. In particular, this 'islands parable' was adopted by Lucas (1972, 1973, 
1975), Lucas and Prescott (1974), and Barro (1976, 1980). These models consider 
an economy in which a single output is produced, which must be divided 
between private consumption, government consumption, and next period's 
capital. The population consists of identical households, so that their utility 
functions do not differ. The conjunction of these two assumptions implies that 
economie agents do not differ from each other with respect to their utility 
functions and their productive activities. However, this does not mean that there 
are no differences at all between these agents. As Lucas (1975, p. 180) stated, 
the 'islands' or markets are "imperfectly linked both physically and informatio-
nally", so that information is assumed to be homogeneous across agents in a 
given market, but heterogeneous across markets.47 The 'island approach' thus 
participants is higher. In the case of synergism the reverse holds. Agent i's costs and benefits of 
participating in an activity can therefore be modelled as a function of the number of participants. 
Their analysis comes to the conclusion that "[o]nly under very special conditions do Standard [i.e. 
micro-type] rational expectations and aggregate rational expectations yield equivalent results" (p. 
631). It turns out that H[t]he size of the difference [between the two equilibria) will be larger (i) the 
larger is the divergence in expectations under aggregate rational expectations, and (ii) the more 
synergistic is the environment" (p. 631). This means that New Classicals implicitly assume that 
there is no congestion or synergism. The number of participants does not influence the individuals' 
cost-benefit analysis. 
47
 According to Pesaran (1989, p. 57), this feature follows from the New Classical assumption 
that "[a]ll firms [or individuals] observe current equilibrium prices in their local markets." Such 
prices clear the market under consideration, thus conveying all information on that market. As on 
a given market individuals derive their information from observing the same equilibrium price, they 
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assumes that economie agents only differ from each other as regards their infor-
mation sets. Hence, it disregards 'intra-market' distributional effects. The study 
of such effects between markets, however, appears to remain possible. 
As was stated above, the EBCT explains industrial fluctuations in terms 
of expectational errors. These errors are caused by discrepancies between 
changes in the relative prices and in the general price level. That is, the econo-
mie agents must determine how much of a given change in their respective local 
prices must be attributed to a change in the general price level, and how much 
of the change in local prices reflects changes in real factors. The relevant 
decision variable thus is the difference between local price changes and global 
price changes: dt(z) = pt(z) - pv where the subscripts denote the time period 
under consideration, and z is an index of location. In 'islands models' agents 
have complete local and incomplete global information. Their information sets 
thus include only pt(z), and not pv They must then form expectations about the 
latter price change. These expectations are rationa!, so that the agents are 
assumed to know the 'true' probability distribution of ^(z).48 According to 
Pesaran (1989, p. 57), this means that the problem of heterogeneity of informati-
on across markets is circumvented. After all, the relevant decision variable is 
dt(z), and all agents are assumed to know its 'true' distribution. As there can only 
be one 'true' distribution, this means that their respective information sets do not 
differ in any relevant (i.e. systematic) manner.49 Information about the relevant 
decision variable turns out to be homogeneous across markets. The problem of 
the heterogeneity of information across markets in the 'islands' models is thus 
circumvented by assuming that all economie agents know the 'true' probability 
distributions of dt(z).50 
will have identical information. That is, information will be homogeneous on that market, but 
heterogeneous across markets. 
48
 The fact that the agents know the 'true' probability distributions of changes in the money 
supply, and in the distribution of individuals over both markets is merely another way of stating 
that expectations are formed rationally in the sense of Muth (1961). Muth's REH holds that "... 
expectations of firms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribution of outcomes) tend 
to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory (or the 
'öbjective' probability distributions of outcomes)" (p. 316). 
49
 Barro (1976, p. 85) explicitly assumed that"... all markets have the same ex ante distribution 
of price ..." 
50
 McCallum (1979) and Machlup (1983) have criticized the New Classical assumption that 
economie agents know the 'true' probability distributions, because it implies that they also know 
the 'correct' structure ('model') of the economy. It is not even dear why all agents would use the 
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In conclusion, the 'islands approach' and the 'representative-agent 
approach' adopt identical assumptions as regards the differences between 
economie agents. In both approaches economie agents are assumed not to differ 
with respect to their utility functions, their abilities to gather information (and 
hence their relevant information sets), their expectations formation functions 
(and, given the information sets, their expectations) and their productive 
activities. This implies that the New Classical 'solution' to the Cournot problem 
leads to the elimination of Cantillon effects from the domain of business cycle 
theory. This elimination appears to be the price paid for abstraction and 
mathematical formalization.51 
5. Conclusions 
According to Blaug (1985, p. 155),"... the Cantillon effect... denies 'the homoge-
neity postulate' by asserting that changes in prices produced by cash injections 
vary with the nature of the injection and, moreover, that changes in absolute 
prices are almost always associated with alterations in relative prices." Our 
analysis allows for a more explicit formulation of this homogeneity postulate. In 
particular, the NCE assumes that economie agents are homogeneous with 
respect to: 
(1) the utility functions, 
(2) the abilities to gather information (and hence the information sets), 
(3) the expectations formation processes (and, given (2), the expectati-
ons), and 
(4) their productive activities (i.e. the order of goods they produce). 
These assumptions reflect that the EBCT explains cyclical fluctuations in terms 
of aggregate variables, thereby implying that distributional effects do not play an 
important role. In contrast, the ABCT also incorporates changes in the composi-
tion of the aggregate variables. It stresses the complexity of social reality, but in 
doing so it completely surrenders to the impossibility of solving the Cournot 
same (New Classical) 'model', and hence why expectations would be Muth-rational. Frydman 
(1983, p. 115) concluded that "... the assumption that agents form rational expectations appears to 
conflict with the fact that the economy is decentralized." 
51
 Of course, whether this price should be paid depends on the empirical importance of the 
distribution effects to be eliminated. This empirical question differs from the purely theoretical one 
which is addressed in this paper. 
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problem in principle. The ABCT allows for the inclusion of Cantillon effects 
and the ensuing (comparative-static) non-neutrality of money, but it does so at 
the cost of analytical - or at least mathematical - rigour. In contrast, the NCE 
undertakes a practical attempt to solve, or rather to circumvent, the so-called 
Cournot problem by introducing simplifying assumptions. This restricts the 
domain of economie explanation because it eliminates Cantillon effects. As a 
result, the NCE must assume that anticipated changes in the money supply rale 
are neutral in a comparative-static sense. This is the price to be paid for the 
methodological prescription that economie theories should be formulated as 
mathematical models. 
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